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SHERRER & COE CASES
RES JUDICATA AND INTERSTATE DIVORCE
Sherrer v. Sherrer' and Coe v. Coe'
The Supreme Court, in two companion cases decided in
June 1948, partially settled one of the points of conflict left
open by both the first and second case of Williams v. North
Carolina.3 In the Sherrer case, the facts were these: Mrs.
Sherrer, after twelve years of residence in Massachusetts
with her husband, left that state accompanied by her chil-
dren and went to Florida, ostensibly for vacation purposes.
Shortly after her arrival in the state of Florida, however,
she notified her husband that she did not intend to return
to him. Securing housing accommodations and employ-
ment, she enrolled her older child in school. On July 6,
1944, she filed divorce proceedings, alleging cruelty, and
notification of the pendency of such proceedings was sent
by mail to her husband. He entered a general appearance
through counsel, filing denials to all allegations of the com-
plaint, including the allegation as to the petitioner's Florida
residence. Mr. Sherrer appeared personally and testified
concerning a stipulation as to the custody of the children.
His counsel represented him throughout the trial, but did
not cross-examine petitioner or present any rebuttal evi-
dence. Special note should be made of the Supreme Court's
expressed recognition of this fact. A divorce was granted
in November, 1944, the Court finding "that the petitioner
is a bona fide resident of the State of Florida, and that this
Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter in said cause; . . ." The ex-Mrs. Sherrer then mar-
ried one Phelps, and, after a short lapse of time, this couple
returned to Massachusetts, apparently for the reason that
Phelps' father was ill. Mr. Sherrer then instituted suit in
Massachusetts, attempting to have the Florida divorce set
aside. The Massachusetts Court considered itself not pre-
cluded from examining the question of the existence of a
bona fide domicil in Florida; and, therefore, it examined
the evidence bearing upon that question and concluded that
there was no such domicil in Florida that could give that
State's court jurisdiction for divorce. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts affirmed the action of the lower
Court.
1334 U.S. 343 (1948).
2334 U.S. 378 (1948).
8317 U.S. 287, 143 A.L.R. 1273 (1942); 325 U.S. 226, 157 A.L.R. 1366
(1945). For a complete discussion of the first Williams case, see Strahorn
and Reiblich, The Haddock Case Overruled - The Future of Interstate
Divorce, 7 Md. L. Rev. 29 (1942).
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The Court dealt with the facts in the Coe case as though
they presented substantially the same situation as those in
the Sherrer case, although the facts in the Coe case were
sufficiently different possibly to distinguish the holding and
principles from that of the Sherrer case. The Coe case could
have been disposed of on the basis of a very present estoppel
contained therein. In the Coe case, Mrs. Coe filed a petition
for separate support in a County Probate Court of the State
of Massachusetts, the state of domicil of both parties. This
petition was granted, and the libel for divorce which Mr.
Coe filed with his answer was dismissed. Mr. Coe then
went to Nevada and instituted divorce proceedings in that
state, alleging he was a bona fide resident of that state.
Upon receiving notice of this suit, Mrs. Coe went out to
Nevada, filed an answer to the complaint and also a cross-
complaint for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty.
She admitted as true petitioner's allegations as to his resi-
dence. Both parties appeared personally at the hearing,
petitioner testifying that he had come to Nevada with the
intention of making that state his home. The Court, find-
ing that it had jurisdiction over both the parties and the
subject matter, granted a divorce in favor of Mrs. Coe as
prayed for in her cross-complaint. Mr. Coe then married a
second wife and that couple, shortly thereafter, returned
to Massachusetts. Mrs. Coe, the first, filed a petition in
Massachusetts, praying that her husband, be held in con-
tempt for failing to abide by the terms of the Massachusetts
separate support decree and also that such decree be modi-
fied so as to give her a larger allowance. The lower Court
refused to question the validity of the Nevada domicil on
the grounds that to allow such collateral attack on the
Nevada divorce in order to sustain the continued effective-
ness of the Massachusetts decree was inconsistent with the
requirement of full faith and credit. The Supreme Court
of Massachusetts reversed the lower Court, holding that the
investigation of whether the Nevada domicil was bona fide
was proper. Upon further proceedings, in which the lower
Court examined the domicil in Nevada, as instructed, it
was found that no such bona fide domicil existed, and, there-
fore, the Nevada divorce was void. The Massachusetts de-
cree for separate support was then not only upheld, but
modified in favor of the wife. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts reversed as to this modification only, and
again sent the case back for further proceedings, but, as is
carefully pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, in no
manner did the state Court suggest that the earlier Massa-
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chusetts decree could be sustained if the Nevada divorce
were valid.4
The Supreme Court considered these two cases as pre-
senting the very same questions: whether divorce granted
in a proceeding in which both parties appeared, but made
no bona fide dispute as to the jurisdiction of the Court,
could be collaterally attacked in the non-granting state by
such parties by showing that there was actually no bona fide
domicil in the granting state so as to give that state jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter - the marital status. The
Supreme Court, by very strong and categorical language
answered in the negative. In these cases, the Court invoked
merely the normal application of the doctrine of res judi-
cata, by which a judgment or decree of a court becomes
binding upon parties to the suit who had the opportunity to
contest the rendering of such judgment or decree but did
not.
Prior to 1938, there was doubt whether the doctrine of
res judicata could be applied to the question of a court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter in an in rem proceed-
ing. The objection to the application of res judicata in such
a proceeding was that it would have the effect of allowing
the parties by their consent to confer jurisdiction over the
subject matter. When applied to divorce the use of the doc-
trine of res judicata would mean that the importance of
having an end to litigation would outweigh the historic
policy of confining the court's action only to subject matter
before it, viz., the marital status of parties domiciled .within
the state.
The Supreme Court, in 1938, ruled that res judicata is
applicable to the question of the court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter, a ruling that has been subsequently
followed without question.5 In the same year, the Supreme
Court applied the same rule to a divorce proceeding in the
case of Davis v. Davis.' In that case, however, there was a
bona fide dispute and litigation over the question of the
petitioner's domicil. Naturally, there arose the query of
whether the Davis holding would be limited to the facts of
the case or whether it would be extended to include any
case where the parties had appeared before the court grant-
, See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) ; Krieger v. Krieger, 334 U.S. 555
(1948), noted, And Now That You Have Your Divorce, Where Do You
Standf, 10 Md. L. Rev. 256 (1949).
5 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938) ; Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
308 U.S. 66 (1939) ; Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371 (1940). Note, Judgment On Merit8 As Re8 Judicata of Juris-
diction Over Subject Matter, 49 Yale L. J. 959 (1940).
6305 U.S. 32, 118 A.L.R. 1518 (1938).
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ing the divorce. Because of the domiciliary state's close in-
terest in the marital status of its residents, it was thought
that the Davis case might be limited to its facts, viz., an
actual dispute and litigation determining the establishment
of domicil in the granting state.
In the first case of Williams v. North Carolina7 revers-
ing the Haddock case, the Supreme Court, by declaring that
all single-domicil divorces must be given recognition under
the full faith and credit clause, started a new trend towards
certainty as to the extraterritorial validity and effect of
divorces granted by one of the several states where some-
thing less than the domicil of both spouses was present.
The next question was how far the Court would (or could)
go toward the compulsory universal acceptance of divorces.
It was confronted with the problem of balancing the desire
and need for uniformity in the recognition of divorces (a
need recognized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concur-
ring opinion in that case) against the detriment to the
sovereignty of the non-granting states caused by the im-
position upon them of the obligation to accept the laxer
divorce laws and policies of the granting state. The second
Williams case explicitly left to the states the power to re-
investigate the fact of the existence of a bona fide domicil
which was the basis of jurisdiction of the granting state
over the marital status. The Sherrer and Coe cases do not
necessarily limit such power of a state, as in the Williams'
situation, to collaterally attack the Nevada divorce in a
prosecution of a bigamous subsequent marriage. Strictly
speaking, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied as
a bar against it and it is still undetermined whether the
non-granting state which claims to be the matrimonial
domicil of the parties may itself re-investigate jurisdiction
of the decree granting state. However, as between the par-
ties to the original suit, it is clear that the Court is leaving
little (or even no) opportunity for re-litigation.
There is no doubt that the rule of the Davis case has
been enlarged; the question is merely one of how great
has the expansion been. It is true that in the Sherrer case
there was a general appearance by the defendant therein.
Even so, the Court recognized the fact that such appear-
ance was not for the purpose of testing the jurisdiction of
the Florida court, and that there was no bona fide dispute
over the issue of jurisdiction of that court. The commenta-
tors agree that it seems to be settled that where the defen-
dant has appeared for any purpose, the doctrine of res
7 Supra, n. 3.
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judicata is applicable and precludes both parties from re-
litigating the issue of the validity of the decree granted,
even though there was no bona fide dispute over the issue
of the jurisdiction of the granting court.' Furthermore, the
fact that the defendant in his pleadings made a denial of
every allegation contained in the complaint seems to be
irrelevant, for such a denial alone would not seem to con-
stitute a bona fide contest under the Davis case. The im-
portance of the general denial vanishes completely, for in
the companion Coe case, the Court founded its decision on
the same ground on which the Sherrer case was based, viz.,
res judicata.
In the Coe case, aside from the fact that jurisdiction of
the Court was admitted, the Court ignored another distin-
guishing factor and, therefore, such factor loses its signifi-
cance as a possible basis for any distinction between the
two cases and further extends the holding of the Sherrer
case. In the Coe case, the party in whose favor the Nevada
divorce was given sought to attack it collaterally in Massa-
chusetts. In general, one who has obtained a divorce or
who acts in reliance upon such decree, as by remarrying,
is estopped from collaterally attacking such divorce decree,
even though the granting court had no jurisdiction.9 Hence
the Supreme Court could have based its decision in the Coe
case on the grounds of estoppel, but instead it rested its
holding squarely on res judicata. By linking the Coe case
with the Sherrer case and putting the two cases on the same
ground as far as principle is concerned, the Court indicates
that its holdings apply to any case where the parties actu-
ally appear for any reason, even though there is no dispute
even in the pleadings as to the jurisdiction of the Court.
In such case, a decree, as far as the parties to the suit are
concerned, must be given recognition for all intents and
purposes under the full faith and credit clause,'" and both
parties are precluded from collaterally attacking the divorce
by challenging the jurisdiction of the granting court.
According to techniques taught by the science of juris-
prudence, there is ample justification for accepting the
8 GOODICH: CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d Ed. 1949), Sec. 23; Holt, The Conflict
of Laws in Divorce, 1949 Ill. Law Forum, 625, 633-634; Paulsen, Migratory
Divorce - Chaps. III and IV., 24 Ind. L. Rev. 27, 36-41 (1948).
' See Strahorn and Reiblich, supra, n. 3, p. 62, and f.n. 98.
10 See note, General Appearance in Foreign Divorce Held to Preclude
Collateral Attack on Unzitigated Facts, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1941), to the
effect that in Frost v. Frost, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 753 (1940), a case very similar to
the Coe case, the New York Court, though talking estoppel, further bases
Its holding on res judicata in order to give the earlier out-of-state decree
recognition under the full faith and credit clause.
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theory that the Court in these two cases laid down as a
categorical proposition that any appearance before the
granting court of the parties prevents them from re-litigat-
ing the issue, and the effect of the decree upon their marital
status is binding upon them. As was seen, such justifica-
tion lies in the fact that the Court in the Sherrer case ren-
dered its decision after expressly accepting the fact that
the general appearances and pleadings of Mr. Sherrer did
not constitute a bona fide dispute and then dismissing these
factors as irrelevant. In effect, the Court is saying that
these factors are totally immaterial and that the appearance
of the party seeking to attack collaterally the decree is the
controlling element of the case. The Coe case supplements
this argument. But there is a note of caution to be added
in light of the fact that the Supreme Court in recent years
has often departed from a strict application of stare decisis.
Such departures may more readily occur when there has
been a strong dissent from the earlier opinion.
A basis for limiting these cases may be laid as follows:
The language of the Coe case can be disregarded com-
pletely, for there is the estoppel, an element upon which the
case could have been disposed; in the Sherrer case, though
Mr. Sherrer appeared generally, he, in his pleading, denied
his wife's Florida domicil and the jurisdiction of the Court.
Though this is not a true litigation of the jurisdiction of the
Florida Court, it, at least, presented the jurisdictional ques-
tion. Let us pose a hypothetical case in which the respond-
ent does not, as in the Sherrer case, file a general denial
to the complaint or, as in Coe, file a cross bill for divorce
but only attacks the merits of the case, e.g., he denies com-
mission of adultery or alleged desertion. It may be argued
that the fact that the court has personal jurisdiction over
the parties by virtue of their consent has no effect since
divorce proceedings are in rem or, at least quasi in rem.
The Sherrer case precludes one from collaterally attacking
jurisdiction over the res after he has made a denial thereof
in his pleading; the Coe case, after one files a successful
cross-bill for divorce, in the granting court. But in the
hypothetical case, no such denial was made, no such cross-
bill has been granted, and the Supreme Court might seize
upon this to say that the issue of the jurisdiction of the
granting court was never before that court, was never liti-
gated before that court, and further, to permit the defen-
dant in the divorce suit to collaterally attack it would be
conferring jurisdiction on the granting court by mere con-
sent. In view of the specific language of the court as applied
[VOL. XI
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to the actual situation out of which the Sherrer and Coe
cases arose, this argument is nebulus. But a distinction, as
above described, if made when the occasion arose, might
not be too surprising to students of modern jurisprudence
nor would it be unwelcome to those holding sacred the
rights of the states over the marital status of those living
therein.
It seems beyond doubt that the present position of the
Court is that where there is an actual appearance of the
parties before the court, for any purpose, in divorce pro-
ceedings, the matter decided or which might have been
litigated by it becomes res judicata as to those parties.
Will the same be true where there is something less than
an actual appearance of the party himself throughout the
hearing? In Andrews v. Andrews,"- the defendant with-
drew her appearance before the decree was granted, pur-
suant to a consent agreement between the parties. The
Supreme Court sustained the Massachusetts Court in hold-
ing this out-of-state divorce void for lack of domicil. Now,
under Sherrer and Coe, the doctrine is laid down that an
opportunity to defend measured by an appearance gives
rise to res judicata. Thus, these two cases read together
seem to require recognition of a divorce of the Andrews
type, for the appearance of the parties was sufficient to
give the defendant an opportunity to defend. Indeed, the
Court said that the principles of the Andrews case are over-
ruled if inconsistent with those of the present companion
cases. Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has said the
Andrews case is overruled,12 the rationale of the Andrews
case was recognized as the controlling law by the Circuit
Court of Baltimore City in July, 1945,13 in upholding the
principle that parties to an action could not give the court
jurisdiction of the subject matter by their consent alone.
But the Supreme Court, proceeds on the assumption that if
the granting court, 4 being a competent court, decides that
it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, arising from
contacts other than consent of the parties and independent
of the consent of the parties, the application of res judicata
precludes further litigation on this point. Jurisdiction then,
is deemed not to arise from consent of the parties, merely
because it cannot further be questioned. It arises from the
determination of the Court.
u 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
2Epstein v. Epstein, 66 A. 2d 381 (Md. 1949).
13 Schwartz v. Schwartz, Daily Record, June 21, 1945 (Cir. Ct. Balto. City).
,Supra, n. 1, 355-56.
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The supposition that a competent court decides the ques-
tion of its jurisdiction over the subject matter in the first
instance is the basis of the composite dissent by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter (Mr. Justice Murphy concurring) to the two
companion cases now being reviewed."5 The dissent labors
the fact that, as a practical matter, there are four or five
states carrying on the industry of granting "bargain-coun-
ter" divorces and that divorce proceedings in such states
are nothing but a sham. To require compulsory recognition
of these divorces is to encourage perjury and to compel
the sister states to accept a contravention of their social
policy regarding the marital status, by means of a constitu-
tionally required projection of the laws of a state having
no actual interest in the marital status which it attempted
to dissolve. Further, it is argued that the legislature, alone,
has the power to change the policy in this country in
regards to divorce laws and to effect uniformity thereof 16
And no power lies in the courts to bring about such uni-
formity, no matter how desirous they are in reaching such
a result. The dissenting opinion feels that the holding of
the majority has gone far in opening the way to uniformity
by court action. The next step is to prevent re-litigation of
fraud in the original proceedings. This recognition by the
dissent of the great step that the majority has taken is
justification for accepting the holding of the Court to be as
broad as to the rights of the parties before it as the language
in the majority opinion indicates.
The Court recognizes as permissible the subsequent
questioning of domicil in the case of ex parte divorces.
Hence Walker v. Walker 7 remains controlling in Maryland,
and mere notice of the pending suit in a foreign jurisdic-
tion does not preclude the defendant from collaterally
attacking the decree on the basis of lack of jurisdiction of
the granting court. Evidently, it feels the "due process"
requirement is not sufficiently satisfied to warrant the ex-
tension of the present holdings to ex parte divorces. How-
ever, what if there is merely an appearance through coun-
sel? In Schwartz v. Schwartzi" the Circuit Court of Balti-
more City, relying on those cases following the Andrews
1Supra, n. 1, 356.
1 This is no way inconsistent with the concurring opinion in the first
Williams case, in which Justice Frankfurter recognized the desirability of
uniformity in the divorce laws of several states, but also recognized that
such uniformity can only be brought about ultimately by a constitutional
amendment and partially by congressional action.
17125 Md. 649, 94 A. 346 (1915).
13 Supra, n. 13. But is case overruled by Maryland Court of Appeals? See,
aupra, n. 12.
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case, held that in such case, the fact of a bona fide domicil
in Nevada could be questioned. Now, since the states feel
that their interests in the marital status of the residents
should be protected, they will probably try to distinguish
such cases from the Sherrer and Coe situation. But, as
counsel will more likely protect his absent client's interest
just as well, if not better, than if the latter were present,
the Supreme Court can logically only hold the doctrine of
the Sherrer and Coe cases to be applicable, since it feels
that "vital rights and interests involved in divorce litiga-
tion" may not be "held in suspense pending the scrutiny
by courts of sister states of findings of jurisdictional fact
made by a competent court.. .. " However, the Court has
not gone so far as to say that a mere opportunity to appear
will suffice for res judicata to apply, and it is extremely
doubtful that the Court will ever go that far.
Before concluding this discussion, a brief consideration
must be had of the effect of the Sherrer and Coe doctrine
upon the right of the sister states themselves collaterally to
attack the validity of a Nevada and Florida decree granted
in the situation present in the cases before us. Do these
decisions preclude Massachusetts from now prosecuting Mr.
Sherrer and Mr. Coe for bigamy? The very words of these
cases speak in terms of the parties to the original suit being
barred from instituting further litigation, although, at the
same time, broader language was used indicating that the
original decree might stand for all purposes under the full
faith and credit clause. The principle applied in the Sherrer
case was ". . . the proposition that the requirements of full
faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking
a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of
sister states where there has been participation by the
defendant in the divorce proceeding, where the defendant
has been accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdic-
tion issues.... "20 The res judicata doctrine definitely binds
the parties to the original suit. They, by the conduct in
such suit, have put themselves and those in privity with
them in such a position as to be unable to show the truth
or what might be the truth. This is the essence of res
judicata, as well as the estoppel doctrine. But the State
of Massachusetts was not a party to the original suit. Hence,
there is nothing in legal theory precluding it from show-
ing the truth, viz., no valid domicil. The cases before us
do not say that the out-of-state divorces are valid. Rather,
19 Supra, n. 1, 356.
20 Supra, n. 1, 351.
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they merely hold that the parties before the court are pre-
cluded from raising the "jurisdictional issues" again. It is
true that in case of jurisdiction being had over the res in an
in rem proceeding, full faith and credit must be given to
the decree of the court. But for full faith and credit to
operate on a particular decree, it must first be determined
if the court rendering the questionable decree had the
proper jurisdiction over the subject matter. And, on the
holding of these cases, nothing prevents the sister state
from raising the jurisdictional issue and showing the in-
validity of the out-of-state decree. What might stand as a
bar would be the strong language of the Court in deny-
ing to the recognizing state the right to assert its clearly
expressed statutory policy with reference to out-of-state
divorces obtained by its domiciliaries. After saying that
this case involves an "inconsistent assertion of power by
courts of two states of the Federal Union and thus presents
considerations which go beyond the interests of local policy,
however vital", and that it is not the function of the Court
to weigh the merits of the policies of the states, the Court
says full faith and credit does not amount to "something
less than the duty to accord full faith and credit to decrees
of divorce entered by courts of sister States". Going further,
the Court again said, "If in its (full faith and credit clause)
application, local policy must be required to give way, such
'is part of the price of our federal system'."'" The Court
concludes by pointing out that the nature of the personal
interests involved require that the litigation should termi-
nate in the courts of the state in which judgment was ren-
dered. Such language indicates that the majority of the
present Court is balancing the scales heavily in favor of
rendering one's personal status certain, and, therefore,
there is a possibility that the Court will find a means of
preventing the sister states from prosecuting for bigamy
in the Sherrer-Coe situation, if such an issue be presented.
In the dissenting opinion, there are a few words sub-
stantiating the view that these cases do not in any way
prevent the state from prosecuting for bigamy, and that the
2nd Williams case remains law in that respect. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter asserts that in situations like herein present,
the state is expressing its sovereign power when it speaks
through the courts, although the litigation is between
private parties.22 Such interest of the state is expressed the
same as if it had instituted criminal prosecution. By setting
= Ibid, 354-356. Italics supplied.
Ibid, 360-364.
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forth this idea, the dissent impliedly indicates that the
majority of the Court was not concerned with safeguarding
the interests of the states and did not consider itself faced
with a determination of the rights of the states as regards
the subsequent prosecution for bigamy, (if another marriage
ensues), but was merely determining the right of the parties
in a civil action tainted with a public interest that was
insufficient to have a bearing on the outcome of the case.
Conceding that the parties appearing in the original
suit are forever precluded from collaterally attacking the
decree rendered, there is left the uncertainty as to the
ability of the parties to validly remarry and return to the
state that contends it still is the domicil of the purportedly
dissolved marriage.23 Thus, it seems that while the Court
clarifies one issue, it casts doubts upon others. This further
indicates that certainty as to the extraterritorial effect of
the foreign divorce is difficult of achievement by the Judi-
ciary. It can be more easily obtained through Congressional
legislation (pursuant to a constitutional amendment, if
necessary).
2 The Court of Appeals of New York has recently ruled that a New York
resident's appearance in his wife's Florida divorce action does not bar his
daughter's collateral attack on the Florida decree in the New York courts,
relying on language in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), to
support the restriction of the doctrine of Sherrer v. Sherrer. In Re Estate
of Johnson, 18 L. W. 2490 (N.Y. Ct. App., Apr. 13, 1950).
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